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Is LAw DEAD? Edited by Eugene V. Rostow. New York: Simon 8c 
Schuster. 1971. Pp. 416. $8.95. 
This book is part of a literature that has burgeoned in recent 
years. A substantial number of volumes (many in symposium form) 
have appeared which attack issues of undoubted importance: the 
philosophical and moral bases of political obligation, the legitimacy 
of law, the justification (if any) of civil disobedience, the contribution 
to social reform (if any) that may be expected from the law, the 
"right" of revolution. Harold Laski once observed that "in no age 
are fundamental questions raised save where the body politic is dis-
eased."1 If so, this literature provides striking evidence of social 
pathology for anyone remaining to be convinced. It would be pleas-
ant to report that the exposition in these books regularly reaches the 
level of the great themes it treats. Unhappily, this is not true. Too 
often the writing is turgid, repetitive, and tendentious. One who 
samples modem disputation on questions of political and legal obli-
gation may be reminded of George Orwell's observation on religious 
controversy: "the most absorbing game ever invented, because it 
goes on forever and because just a little cheating is allowed."2 
The book under review avoids the worst faults of its genre. I 
find the title a little slick and deceptive: the essays are concerned less 
with the death of law than with the prospects and conditions for its 
revitalization. There is some ideological posturing on the part of a 
few participants, some of the inevitable sanctimoniousness that char-
acterizes the prevailing polemical mode and which today is widely 
confused with seriousness. Compared with the very substantial vir-
tues of the book, however, these complaints are rather trivial; for it 
is, in fact, a useful and impressive volume and maintains a higher 
and more consistent level of quality than do most symposia. No 
doubt, a large part of the credit for this achievement belongs to 
Professor Eugene V. Rostow, who is editor of the volume and who 
was selected by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
to organize the conference, held in the spring of 1970, at which the 
papers were first presented. 
The editor offers the eleven principal papers under two headings. 
Part I is entitled "The Citizen's Moral Relation to the Law in a So-
ciety of Consent." Part II bears the heading "The Capacity of the 
American Social Order To Meet the Changing Demands for Social 
Justice Through the Methods of Law." Curiously enough, none of 
1. H. LAsKI, PourICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND FROM l.oCKE TO BENTHAM 212 (1920). 
2. G. ORWELL, A CLERGYMAN'S DAUGHTER 78 (1935). 
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the papers in the second part was written by a lawyer. Whether for 
this or for other reasons, I found the papers in Part I more inter-
esting; but a reader scanning the second part ought not to overlook 
the elegant and impressive essay by the late historian, David M. 
Potter.3 Each paper is followed by the critique of at least one com-
mentator. Although the quality of this commentary is far from uni-
form, much of it is lively and illuminating. 
In addition to his services as editor of the volume, Professor 
Rostovv contributed what must be regarded as the central essay in 
the collection, a paper entitled "The Rightful Limits of Freedom in 
a Liberal Democratic State: Of Civil Disobedience." I do not mean 
to say that this paper is clearly the best of the symposium or even 
that its quality will be perceived and acknowledged by all readers. 
It is the paper, however, which provides the springboard for a great 
deal of what is said by other participants; it performs the function 
of catalyst and irritant. In this essay Professor Rostow opposes the 
tide of contemporary writing (if not of popular feeling) and under-
takes a systematic ethical and political justification of fidelity to the 
law. His thesis, he says, is "that our society-as a society of consent 
-should not and indeed cannot acknowledge a right of civil dis-
obedience; that the moral and philosophical arguments advanced in 
support of such a right are in error; and that the analogies invoked 
in its behalf are inapplicable" (p. 45). The defense of such a thesis, 
if pursued seriously and with reasonable intellectual rigor, is a for-
midable endeavor. It is remarkable how infrequently such attempts 
have been made in the tumultuous years just past and how few per-
sons have arisen to meet the challenge of those championing quite 
different propositions. 
Professor Rostovv premises his argument on the principle of con-
sent, on the assertion that the just powers of government derive from 
the consent of the governed. Since the argument very nearly em-
braces traditional social-contract theory, certain evasive maneuvers 
are required to avoid some of the pitfalls identified by critics of 
compact theory during the past two and one-half centuries. Thus, 
Professor Rostow would not rest his case for the support of govern-
ment and its law simply on the ground that the citizen receives bene-
fit from government. Otherwise (as the specter of Hobbes makes 
manifest) the citizen may be thought to owe allegiance to a tyranny, 
for even despotism confers some benefits upon its subjects. Instead, 
it is argued, the moral obligation arises "from the necessary condi-
tions of social cooperation within different kinds of societies" (p. 47). 
A greater obligation to obey the law is imposed on the citizen of a 
liberal, democratic nation because the freedom and tolerance of a 
3. "Changing Patterns of Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law Under a System of 
Government by Consent" (pp. 260-85). 
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free society presuppose voluntary adherence to the laws and the 
minimization of coercion. "Errors" and moral failures of the politi-
cal society do not relieve the citizen of his moral obligation to obey 
the law, unless such failings "breach the essential terms of the social 
contract itself" (p. 49). 
What about the usual justifications of civil disobedience? They 
do not withstand scrutiny, says Professor Rostow. The example of 
Gandhi fails, for his movement was directed against laws not founded 
on the consent of the Indian people. The American revolution es-
tablishes no general "right" of revolution. The position of the colo-
nists was that British rule had breached the social compact, and 
broader theories of the "right" were rejected for all time by the 
outcome of the Civil War. Does past treatment of the Negro exempt 
him from obligation to the law? This, says the writer, "is the most 
difficult problem of social theory in American life" (p. 69). Yet the 
conclusion is the same, and is rested on the pragmatic grounds that 
progress is being made to extend equality to black persons and that 
this progress is the achievement of the law, not of its violation. Law 
has led, not followed, public opinion in this area. Indeed, in many 
areas, such as labor relations, in which illegality and violence have 
sometimes been pointed to as successful political tactics, lawlessness 
may have delayed progress; and when reform came, it came through 
the law, not outside it. 
For Professor Rostow, however, the case for compliance with the 
law is not simply a product of utilitarian calculation; it has a pro-
found ethical dimension as well. 
Individual liberty can be respected and protected only in a 
society based on a shared understanding as to the broad aspirations 
of the law. Social concord in this sense requires a general acceptance 
of the citizen's moral obligation to obey valid law. Respect for the 
agreed limits of social conflict is essential if men are to live in 
liberty, and not, in Hobbes's phrase, as wolves. [P. 91.] 
Professor Rostow's essay is the subject of a searching and sensible 
critique by Professor Christopher D. Stone. I shall not summarize 
Professor Stone's argument other than to say that in the course of his 
analysis he exposes what is for me the primary difficulty in the Rostow 
essay. That the law imposes a moral obligation of compliance on the 
citizen is the teaching of most of humanity's great ethical teachers, 
and Professor Rostow has illuminated the bases and range of that 
obligation. The difficulty, however, is that the obligation to obey the 
law is not the only moral obligation imposed on men (or which men 
impose on themselves); and Professor Rostow does not establish the 
absolute priority of legal obligation over all competing moral claims, 
even in a society of consent. The question of dividing what is Caesar's 
from what is God's remains. Thus, I suspect that Professor Stone is 
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right when he asserts that the Rostow essay "stops far short of-in-
deed, is quite indecisive with respect to--convincing anyone in a 
real dilemma" (p. 97). 
It seems to me that the great threat to the viability of the legal 
order today is not posed by the individual offender who after sober 
deliberation concludes that he cannot conscientiously comply with 
the law's commands in a given particular. Ever since Antigone, indi-
viduals have concluded that "it was not Zeus that had published me 
that edict"; and our own history abounds with like examples. More-
over, given the almost inevitable deficiencies in the mechanisms of 
consent, I am not sure that it is entirely a bad thing that those pos-
sessed of political authority should be aware that history may repeat 
itself. We have not done very well with the problems of conscientious 
dissent. On the other hand, our record is far from total failure, and 
greater wisdom and skill are within our capabilities. What is of very 
grave concern is the erosion of the moral authority of the law through-
out the community, and here I believe the weight of Professor Ros-
tow's essay, if read and fairly considered, could contribute to 
rectifying the balance. The imbalance is in part the product of a 
widespread and wholly unjustified insouciance about the costs of law 
violation even in a good cause, a tendency which I think I see in the 
remarks of some of the contributors to the volume, notably Professors 
Robert Paul Wolff4 and Ronald Dworkin.5 As Professor Rostow 
notes, a significant decline in voluntary law compliance raises the 
levels of official coercion. Political liberty does not flourish in a state 
of internal war, however complete the legal justification for the use 
of force by the government may be. One may also hope, even if he 
cannot really expect, that Professor Rostow will succeed in tempering 
the moral absolutism of some of those who feel called to reform this 
society-a series of attitudes best described in old-fashioned theologi-
cal language as the "sin of pride," a sin that apparently holds few 
terrors for many modern theologians. 
The papers that follow Professor Rostow's in Part I of the volume 
fall conveniently into two groups: those concerned primarily with 
the problems of political obligation created by the antagonistic con-
frontation of the individual conscience with the state, and those 
which view as most significant the problems arising from the activities 
and aspirations of organized groups in a pluralistic, democratic so-
ciety. These categories are not mutually exclusive at all points: group 
demands, of course, may reflect the conscientious conviction of indi-
viduals. As these papers demonstrate, however, this difference in 
focus tends to expose quite dissimilar insights and concerns. 
Professor Wolff's paper "In Defense of Anarchism" reveals his 
4. See, e.g., pp. 116-18. 
5. See, e.g., pp. 182-83. 
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overriding concern with the individual conscience by posing at the 
outset the hypothetical case of Stephen, a young man debating his 
response to an induction order and believing that "the American 
cause in Southeast Asia is immoral-not simply imprudent, or short-
sighted, or unpolitic, or on balance a mistake, but immoral" (p. 111 ). 
As I understand Professor Wolff's thesis it is that, in the final analysis, 
no intelligible or defensible basis for political or legal obligation can 
be stated. Obligation arises from the exercise of moral autonomy by 
the individual human being. If a law offends the moral judgment of 
the individual it possesses for him no greater claim to obligation by 
reason of the fact that it is the product of a democratic majority in-
stead of a dictator's edict. In neither case can an autonomous man 
promise obedience without surrendering his moral freedom. This, of 
course, is not to say that an individual, on prudential grounds, may 
not comply with laws he did not make, or, in the exercise of moral 
autonomy, conclude that the consequences of noncompliance some-
times require adherence even to dubious laws. Given this qualifica-
tion, the practical thrust of the argument is far from clear. Professor 
Wolff does make more than one startling observation, however. Re-
ferring to his hypothetical case of the young war resister, he says: 
First of all, let us be clear about the nature of Stepl1en's debt. He ' 
owes nothing to the government of the United States. It is the 
American people whose collective efforts have sustained and protected 
him throughout his life .... Stephen's debt is to the farmers who grew 
his food, to the workers who made his clothes, to the policemen who 
stood ready to protect his life, not to the legislators who made the 
laws under which he lived. [Pp. 118-19.] 
The only assumption upon which this statement becomes intelligible 
to me is that the laws under which young men live make no contri-
bution to their lives. It seems to follow that Stephen has no interest 
in whether laws are good or bad. Perhaps because he is more squarely 
challenging traditional concepts than most of the other contributors, 
Professor Wolff's paper suffers most from the inevitable constriction 
of scope imposed by the symposium format. In any event, it seemed 
to me that some of the criticisms of the paper made by other contrib-
utors to the volume were not fairly responsive to Professor Wolff's 
argument. I shall not add further misunderstanding. 
Professor Dworkin's paper "Taking Rights Seriously" provides 
other difficulties. Some of these arise from his methodology and no-
menclature, especially his use of the term "rights": at times Pro-
fessor Dworkin seems more intent on demonstrating the death of 
Hohfeld than of law. Certainly the "rights" he addresses encompass 
moral rights-rights above and beyond the law. A citizen by reason 
of his humanity possesses a range of rights against government. These 
are rights "in the strong sense," i.e., actions or abstentions which "the 
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government would do wrong to stop ... by arresting and prosecuting 
him" (p. 175). I suppose that Professor Dworkin would say that if 
these rights are not honored by the law, an individual is "justified" 
in violating the law. Although he sometimes speaks the language of 
civil disobedience, the main thrust of his argument is toward an 
enlargement of the law to recognize and "respect" these rights. Ob-
viously, however, if the legal order respects these claims of right, 
they become part of the corpus of the law; in short, they become legal 
rights.6 Hence, the essay is less a justification of civil disobedience 
than an exegesis on what the law ought to be. 
It is clear that Professor Dworkin would give strong support to 
claims of individual right against government and would place a 
heavy burden of persuasion on those urging countervailing consider-
ations of social interest. Much of what he has to say in developing 
these points is persuasive. "Necessity" is the tyrant's plea; and the 
recognition of a body of basic individual rights presupposes a will-
ingness to sacrifice some quantum of social advantage in particular 
cases and to see the will of the majority sometimes frustrated. On the 
other hand, notions of the "preferred position" of basic liberties and 
of "absolute" rights of speech are hardly new, and it is not clear how 
or how far Professor Dworkin diverges from the now almost tradi-
tional academic libertarian stance. Professor Dworkin expressly 
founds his moral calculus on the Kantian respect for individual hu-
man personality and on the principle of equality. The former idea 
presumably underlies his argument that governmental interference 
with an individual's abstention from any war for which he has strong 
moral scruples constitutes an improper invasion of personality. Yet 
viewed from the individual's perspective, governmental interference 
with anything he seriously and strongly wishes to do is likely to be 
seen by him as an invasion of personality. I do not mean that dis-
tinctions cannot be made between the trivial and the fundamental. 
They can and must be made. Perhaps my basic complaint is that I 
do not find Professor Dworkin's categories and distinctions as crisp 
or manageable as he appears to feel I should. Accordingly, the unruly 
realities of concrete cases remain for me about as puzzling and dif-
ficult as before. 
It is, however, in those papers that view the challenge to the le-
gitimacy of law as essentially a group phenomenon that the most 
interesting and important insights are to be found. Professor Gidon 
Gottlieb ·writes, "The most salient feature of recent forms of dis-
obedience is the communal or group character of the phenomenon" 
6. To the extent that "respect" entails appropriate exercise of prosecutors' or police 
discretion, one might view the official reaction as creating other than legal "rights." 
Professor Dworkin does not deal with these questions in the essay under review 
although he has.done so heretofore. See his well-known article, On Not Prosecuting 
Civil Disobedience, NEW YoRK REvmw OF BooKS, June 6, 1968. 
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(p. 194), not the instances of challenge by individuals to state author-
ity. So seen, the modem experience with disobedience becomes an-
other chapter in the history of efforts by the American democracy to 
reconcile the interests and power of minority groups with the institu-
tions of majority rule. This view of the matter is expressed most 
clearly by Professor Gottlieb and Professor Hannah Arendt. In ad-
dition Professor Charles Dyke brings to the discussion the approaches 
and vocabulary of welfare economics, which tend to a somewhat 
comparable emphasis. The paper of Professor David M. Potter on 
changing patterns of social cohesion in the United States adds im-
portant historical dimensions. 
It may well be that the most effective contribution to the sympo-
sium is that of Professor Gottlieb, which he submitted as commentary 
to Professor Dworkin's paper. Modem resistance to law, says Profes-
sor Gottlieb, represents most significantly the activities of groups. 
These groups (he believes) are not capable of conducting a successful 
revolution. As events have demonstrated, they are, however, abun-
dantly capable of creating disorders and preventing the effective en-
forcement of policies from which they have withheld consent. Hence 
they possess the power of veto. The state is helpless to preserve the 
status quo through the use of traditional instrumentalities of coer-
cion, in part because the magnitude of the effort at repression would 
itself transform society into something quite different from what it 
has been or aspired to be. In essence, the state has lost the monopoly 
of power, and our situation today resembles that which obtains in 
the international community: a collocation of semiautonomous 
groups whose aspirations and conflicting interests summon the skills 
of negotiation and accommodation rather than the enforcement of 
consensus through the coercive powers of a hierarchical political 
society. If this view of our situation is accepted, it follows that a whole 
arsenal of new legal instrumentalities must be devised whereby group 
interests may be asserted and advanced and accommodation achieved; 
and something like a revolution in traditional legal attitudes must be 
effected. 
This is not the place to subject these and related ideas to any very 
searching test or even to attempt an adequate articulation of them. 
It is fair to say that these ·writers are more persuasive at diagnosis 
than at prescription, that they see the future through a glass darkly. 
The shape of a legal order devised in response to these views of our 
present predicament is, to say the least, obscure. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to escape the basic insight which these papers express and 
which many other observers have arrived at independently. The 
hopes for a liberal society in the future require some basic revisions 
of American pluralism. There is nothing new about the existence of 
"veto groups" in our society. New centers of power have arisen 
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throughout our history and, after experiencing trauma, we have 
granted tacit recognition to the new groups and conceded them rights 
of participation. The trauma of the present at least appears to be of 
unusual seriousness. These difficulties may arise in part from the fact 
that some of the groups now demanding rights of participation in 
American society practice styles of life quite different from those of 
the established groups and often seriously uncongenial to them. This 
circumstance makes the problem of accommodation painfully visible 
and demands a degree of tolerance seldom achieved in the past. What-
ever the future may require of the law, especially the penal law, it 
will demand a sensitive and accurate capacity to distinguish substance 
from style. Sumptuary regulation has become more than futile; it is 
a threat to our capacity to achieve unity out of diversity. This is only 
the beginning of the matter, not its end. There remain such doubtful 
and unpleasant questions as whether after the demands for diversity 
now being made are accommodated any viable unity will remain, and 
whether the threat to unity will engender pressures to preserve it 
even at the cost of diversity-and of freedom. 
This book constitutes less a map of the future than a device to 
indicate which way the wind is blowing. For one whose expectations 
are appropriately modest, it will repay an evening's reading. 
Francis A. Allen, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
